



International  
Energy Agency

***World Energy Outlook***

***European Geosciences Union GIFT WORKSHOP***

# **ENERGY PERSPECTIVES**

## **2020/2030**

***Austria Center Vienna***

***3 May 2010***

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
**Paris, France**

2009

# The context


- The worst economic slump since the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War & signs of recovery – *but how fast?*
- An oil price collapse & then a rebound – *rising marginal costs point to higher prices in the longer term, but are current levels sustainable?*
- A slump in energy investment due to the financial & economic crisis – *will it bounce back quickly enough to avert a supply squeeze later?*
- Difficult negotiations on a post-2012 climate deal – *what is needed to avert catastrophic climate change?*

# World primary energy demand in the Reference Scenario



***Non-OECD countries account for 93% of the increase in global demand between 2007 & 2030, driven largely by China & India***


# Change in primary energy demand in the Reference Scenario, 2007-2030



***Fossil fuels account for 77% of the increase in world primary energy demand in 2007-2030, with oil demand rising from 85 mb/d in 2008 to 88 mb/d in 2015 & 105 mb/d in 2030***



# Worldwide upstream oil & gas capital expenditures




\* Estimated spending

*Global upstream spending fell in 2009, for the first time in a decade, by over \$90 billion in 2009, but is set to bounce back by around 10% in 2010 on current plans*

# Decline rates are of critical importance to future upstream oil investment needs


## World oil production in the Reference scenario



*Sustained investment is needed mainly to combat the decline in output at existing fields, which will drop by almost two-thirds by 2030*

# The era of cheap energy is over

**Average annual expenditure on net imports  
of oil & gas in the Reference Scenario**




***The Reference Scenario implies persistently high spending on oil & gas imports –  
another key reason to pursue alternative energy policies***

# An uncertain future for Iraqi oil


- Iraq: a decisive driver of global oil markets in the coming decade?
- Iraqi oilfields are mostly technically straightforward and relatively cheap to develop
- The very rapid capacity expansion claimed by politicians is overly optimistic
- But even a modest achievement – e.g. a doubling of current production – would have a significant impact on global oil markets
- Main challenges: security, infrastructure, water and personnel



# Medium-term oil market balance





# Medium-term oil market balance




# Current spotlight on financial markets *but price formation remains multi-faceted*

- Macro/micro-financial trades can affect price short term
- But price inelasticity of demand/supply also amplifies price swings.




# Impact of decline on world natural gas production in the Reference Scenario



**Additional capacity of around 2 700 bcm, or 4 times current Russian capacity, is needed by 2030 – half to offset decline at existing fields & half to meet the increase in demand**


# US natural gas supply in the Reference Scenario



*Thanks mainly to shale gas, US gas output grows gradually through to 2030, outstripping demand & squeezing imports*




# Natural gas transportation capacity



*A glut of gas is developing – reaching 200 bcm by 2015 – due to weaker than expected demand & plentiful US unconventional supply, with far-reaching implications for gas pricing*

# Indicative costs for potential new sources of gas delivered to Europe, 2020 (\$/MBtu)




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on maps included in this publication do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the IEA.

**Although indigenous resources are limited & output is declining, Europe is geographically well placed to secure gas supplies from a variety of external sources**

## More on natural gas


- North American gas prices – downward pressure to continue?
- Pressure on oil-indexed pricing – more innovative gas pricing formulae?
- Growing interest in LNG in Europe and Asia
- More unconventional gas: can the North American success story be replicated elsewhere ?
- Pace of global economic recovery is key to gas and electricity demand prospects

# Demand uncertainty: How strong will be the economic recovery?



**Global electricity consumption could drop by as much as 3.5% in 2009  
– the first annual contraction since the end of the Second World War**

# Number of people without access to electricity in the Reference Scenario (millions)



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
***\$35 billion per year more investment than in the Reference Scenario would be needed to 2030 – equivalent to just 5% of global power-sector investment – to ensure universal access***



# The policy mechanisms in the 450 Scenario


- A combination of policy mechanisms, which best reflects nations' varied circumstances & negotiating positions
- We differentiate on the basis of three country groupings
  - > *OECD+: OECD & other non-OECD EU countries*
  - > *Other Major Economies (OME): Brazil, China, Middle East, Russia & South Africa*
  - > *Other Countries (OC): all other countries, including India & ASEAN*
- A graduated approach
  - > *Up to 2020, only OECD+ have national emissions caps*
  - > *After 2020, Other Major Economies are also assumed to adopt emissions caps*
  - > *Through to 2030, Other Countries continue to focus on national measures*
- Emissions peaking by 2020 will require
  - > *A CO<sub>2</sub> price of \$50 per tonne for power generation & industry in OECD+*
  - > *Investment needs in non-OECD countries of \$200 billion in 2020, supported by OECD+ through carbon markets & co-financing*

# World primary energy demand by fuel in the 450 Scenario




*In the 450 Scenario, demand for fossil fuels peaks by 2020, and by 2030 zero-carbon fuels make up a third of the world's primary sources of energy demand*

# World oil production by scenario




*Curbing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions would also improve energy security by cutting oil demand, but even in the 450 Scenario, OPEC production increases by 11 mb/d between now and 2030*

# Cumulative OPEC oil export revenues by scenario



*Though slightly lower than in the Reference Scenario, OPEC revenues in the 450 Scenario are over four times as high as in the last 20 years*


# World primary natural gas demand by scenario




*Gas demand continues to grow in both scenarios, peaking by around 2025 in the 450 Scenario & highlighting the potential role of gas as a transition fuel to a clean energy future*



# World abatement of energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the 450 Scenario




World abatement by technology




*An additional \$10.5 trillion of investment is needed in total in the 450 Scenario, with measures to boost energy efficiency accounting for most of the abatement through to 2030*

# Abatement in the 450 Scenario by key emitters, 2020




***China, the United States, the European Union, India, Russia & Japan account for almost three-quarters of the 3.8 Gt reduction in the 450 Scenario***

# World primary energy demand by fuel and scenario in 2030




# Incremental world electricity production in the Reference and 450 Scenarios, 2007-2030



***Renewables, nuclear and plants fitted with CCS account for around 60% of electricity generation globally in 2030 in the 450 Scenario, up from less than one-third today***

# World passenger vehicle sales & average new vehicle CO<sub>2</sub> intensity in the 450 Scenario



***Improvements to the internal combustion engine & the uptake of next-generation vehicles & biofuels lead to a 56% reduction in new-car emission intensity by 2030***



# COP15 - A failure or success?

No binding target. Convention takes note of Copenhagen Accord, *but*

(+)

**For the first time: Dg countries pledges (+US)**

**Substantial finance pledged to support vulnerable countries and trigger emission reductions**

**2°C target is a step forward...**

(-)


**...but pledges will likely fall short**

**Some loss of confidence in UNFCCC process**

- Can other processes (Major Economies Forum? G20?) move more effectively?

**Huge efforts still needed to curb CO<sub>2</sub>**

# Copenhagen and the 450 Scenario



*Current pledges point in the right direction but further efforts would be needed to close the gap and reach the 450 Scenario*

# Summary & conclusions

- The financial crisis has halted the rise in global fossil-energy use, but its long-term upward path will resume soon *on current policies*
- Tackling climate change & enhancing energy security require a massive decarbonisation of the energy system
  - > We are now on course for a 6°C temperature rise & rising energy costs
  - > Limiting temperature rise to 2°C will require big emission reductions in all regions
- A 450 path towards 'Green Growth' would bring substantial benefits
  - > Avoiding the worst effects & costs of climate change
  - > Energy-security benefits, lower oil & gas imports & reduced energy bills
  - > Much less air pollution & huge health benefits
- Natural gas can play a key role as a bridge to a cleaner energy future
- The challenge is enormous – but it can and must be met
  - > Improved energy efficiency & technology deployment are critical
  - > Each year of delay adds \$500 bn to mitigation costs between today & 2030